The Ministry of Peace

In George Orwell's famous "1984", government has been simplified into three ironically named Ministries, with the unending war overseen by the "Ministry of Peace". There was a time in the not so recent past when nations were fairly honest about calling that organization their "War Ministry" (England) or "War Department" (USA). At some point however, after the end of the Second World War, Orwellian thinking crept in, and even as the US prepared to engage the world on battlefields far removed from her shores, it was decided that such distasteful matters be handled by a more benign sounding "Defense Department"; defense of one's homeland after all could not be faulted by the most ardent peaceniks, not even when it involved bombing countries on the far side of the world.

Now, for the second time in two decades, the US is contemplating a major reduction in its defense budget. While the last significant cuts were a peace dividend from the end of the Cold War, they were succeeded by a huge build-up in military forces after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and ever increasing involvement in conflicts in Arabia, East Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The latest round of budget cuts are necessitated by a somber realization that we can no longer afford that heady binge of war spending when our debt is spiraling out of control and nearly every other sector of government is being cut past the bone. But while we may no longer be able to afford such a grandiose war machine, the proposed cuts have nevertheless drawn cries of anguish from many quarters.

It's tempting to dismiss such opposition as nothing more or less than the protests of those who benefit from the military-industrial complex, those with a vested financial in continued war spending, but that would be as much a knee-jerk reaction as the worst of theirs. Rather it is worth asking some hard questions of ourselves, starting with the seven hundred billion question: if a war budget that exceeds one third of the entire world's military spending leaves us feeling so insecure about our safety that even modest cuts provoke such anxiety, is it worth the expenditure at all?

According to GlobalSecurity.org, we not only are the world's highest spender by far, we exceed the next SIX countries combined; once you remove neutral (Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil etc) and friendly (NATO and other European allies, Canada, South Korea, Japan) countries from the list, our spending exceeds the next THIRTY FIVE nations on the list! And yet, I saw an article today that our ability to fight more than one war will be seriously compromised if Obama's proposed restructuring is implemented. In which universe do we expect to actually engage in more than one major war of necessity? And when we talk of wars of necessity, that's hawkishly including the invasion of Afghanistan in that category, a war that was about revenge far more than it was about defending our nation or our national interests. When the military introduced the concept of preparing for two simultaneous wars, they had a plausible if unlikely scenario in mind: a Soviet invasion of western Europe and a North Korean attack across the 38th Parallel. In both places, we had commitments to defend our allies, a national interest in maintaining the security of those places and forces in harm's way, and would feel the need to fight those wars. Today, only the delusional would imagine that we need to game for an open war with Russia - they aren't about to invade western Europe and we have few actual interests in checking Russia's moves against former Soviet republics. To put it bluntly, we have commitments there only insofar as we seek them out by trying to expand our influence in those areas.

North Korea does remain a danger, theoretically, but our forces in South Korea would be insufficient to defeat an invasion. Much of the heavy fighting would have to be done by our ally, till we could get a reinforcing army into action, or alternately seek to slow the North Koreans through air and naval power. Significantly, those are the two branches of the military that would see some increases under Obama's plan. The only other ally that might face a military threat is Taiwan, but for decades it has been obvious that the only way we could defend Taiwan was by naval and air power and the deterrent of our missile system. Again, the reduced defense budget would enhance rather than reduce our capabilities.

In other words, we have little need for an army that's able to fight two wars at one time. The only other war being credibly considered is Iran, but the idea of a land force actually invading Iran is ludicrous. Not only did we find that controlling a smaller nation like Iraq to be more than we wanted, we had the advantage of land routes into the country for our invasion force (two routes till poor planning and diplomacy deprived us of the route from Turkey).  In case of Iran we would have to fight our way ashore with no easy staging area with both Iraq and Pakistan unlikely to offer us assistance, while likely fighting a naval battle to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. While there is no question that the US military can do it, the cost would be high, and the deeper we thrust into Iran the higher the cost - Iran's army may be no match for the US, but it is not as crippled by sanctions as Iraq's was, and their military planners have probably studied the successes of the Saddam Fedayeen in Iraq (the most serious obstacle during our invasion of Iraq) and Hezbollah in their fight with Israel in 2006 . On the heels of two costly and somewhat unsuccessful ventures on either side of Iran, it's almost unthinkable that we would actually attempt a ground invasion; if we did we'd need far more troops than we have even today, prior to any cuts. What that means is that any conflict with Iran will be fought from a distance.


The biggest change proposed in the military is the reduction in Army manpower, and a pivot away from nation building and stabilizing abilities. And that seems like an excellent plan. If we were to assume for a moment that the Army was going to be used in such a role in the near future, which troubled region would we choose? Yemen? Somalia? Dafur? Syria? Pakistan? There is no political will to occupy any of those regions, and no guarantee that such action would contribute in any way to an improvement in their situation. And even should the will exist, which would we choose? How would we choose just one (assuming that we'd still maintain our fighting capability in South Korea) when all of them demand equal response? Rather we will follow our far safer approach of support from beyond the borders, as in Libya or through a military surrogate, like Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia currently.

Given the near unique position enjoyed by the US, with no hostile neighbors and self-sufficiency or secure sources of all vital resources, it is really amazing that we are proposing so modest a reduction in our war budgets. Attempting to resolve all our challenges and confront all dangers alone and with force is way beyond the capability of our military, even currently. Our better approach would be to evaluate exactly what our vital interests are - perhaps keeping open trade routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits, abd around the Horn of Africa and - and then working to achieve those aims without force. Keeping a big enough stick handy may be a good idea if all else fails, but carrots can win the same results and are often cheaper. And it's worth remembering that all we need is a big stick not a giant club that may be to heavy to wield and may only end up injuring ourselves.