The Destruction of Sennacherib

Ever since the protests against Assad's regime spiraled out of control, I've been following developments with anticipation. I have to admit I've always had a sneaking partiality for Syria. While their government is undoubtedly ruthless and frequently brutal, they are also in a way the mutts of the Middle East, beloved of no one, with little oil wealth to attract suitors and a history of embarrassing defeats at the hands of Israel, able to play a major role in Lebanon yet rarely respected by friend or foe. When Bashir Assad succeeded his father, there was a brief hope that he would play the reformer so rarely seen in that corner of the world. Yet in the end, he proved to be neither the redeemer of his people nor the iron-handed autocrat Hafeez Assad was; unwilling to react with overt violence when challenged, yet also unwilling to make a truly bold decision, on Lebanon, Sheba Farms, the Golan Heights or eventually the protests against his regime. A part of me hopes that he will somehow find the courage and statesmanship to end the violence in his land and against his own people in an honorable manner but the realist in me knows that Assad has never been that man and that Syria is headed down the same path as Libya and Yemen.

But what really struck me in the aftermath of the Security Council's failure to act pass a resolution against Damascus was the strange reaction in the United States, with even such realists as Hilary Clinton deploring the inability of the Council and many pundits seeing a diminishing of the United Nations Organization in the wake of Russia and China's veto. This seems like a very shallow response and almost willfully ignorant of both history and cold reality. It's worth recalling that in the first four decades of its existence, the UN was able to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force against a nation once, and that action against North Korea was possible because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council and China's vote was still controlled by the Kuomintang. The next couple of decades saw plenty of resolutions brought before the Council condemning actions in various parts of the world, yet few passed and none resulted in UN intervention. The Council was powerless when Soviet troops crushed the hopes of revolution in Hungary or Czechoslovakia. This was no one way street, with the US wielding its own veto in turn to ensure no censure of its action against Libya in 1986 or Grenada in 1982, and extending the shelter of its power to Israel on numerous occasions. Only after the fall of the Soviet Union did we see an unmatched level of cooperation in the United Nations, fostered in part by a controlled reaction on the part of the victors, the United States and a certain deference in China. However as the relative power of each nation changes, China is becoming just a little more assertive of its own interests.

And understanding the interests of the different players is key to understanding the ways to win their cooperation and furthering our own plans. Our childish reaction to the UN refusal to do the right thing is not just counterproductive, it's also self-defeating. We see our desire to stop the bloodshed in Syria as a just and noble cause. However, as one expert on Democracy Now explained very clearly last night, the Assad regime and its Alawite supporters will fight to cling to power with every weapon they have because defeat for them will mean exile at best (and no one around them really wants them) and bloody annihilation at the hands of the liberated majority at worst. In practical terms then, ending the bloodshed is really a euphemism for replacing the current authoritarian setup in Syria with something more palatable to its people, be it a more inclusive and democratic government or a wholesale replacement of the Baath Party. A kindly view of our interests would be that we have the needs of the Syrian people at heart; but our anguish over the bloody struggle is a contrast to our far less voluble interest in other places and peoples under violent oppression. we've stood fairly silently while our client regimes in Central Asia deny their people rights, we've clucked about the violence in Dafur but made few attempts to push through any real change there, and we've been mostly silent behind-the-scenes actors in places like Bahrain and Kuwait. Little wonder then that other nations look askance at our aims in moving a Security Council resolution on Syria that will likely lead to the end of the Assad regime.

When we obtained UN clearance to protect the population in Libya from Gadhafi's wrath, Russia and China were not excited at the latitude that we interpreted in applying that authority. Syria has been a long term ally of Russia, and Putin faces a skeptical electorate this year - he cannot afford to be seen letting an old client and ally get run out of town while he stands helplessly by. Iran, no Great Power in its own right since the days of Cyrus  the Great, nevertheless has pressing interests of its own in Syria. Should Assad's government fall, the new regime will be dominated by Sunnis either religious or secular (most likely the former) but unlikely to be as pliant an ally to Iran or as friendly a patron to Hezbollah. And Iran needs Hezbollah as a key check to Israel, and by extension they then need Assad's government in Damascus. While any new government is likely to be less than cordial to Israel, the turmoil of a revolution and the far more urgent issues thereafter would greatly ease the threat on Israel's northeastern border, and that runs counter to Iran's interests.

China has it's own interests in keeping a very elaborate system of checks and balances in place. Hezbollah is a check on an Israeli strike against Iran, and Iran consumes much of America's attention and resources, especially when they make threats about closing the Straits of Hormuz. There is nothing China would like more than America's attention to fixed firmly on the Middle East, delaying the pivot to the Pacific and giving China a bit more time to improve their position along the western rim. Syria is the key to the complex order, and keeping their regime afloat is then in the interests of nearly everyone else not allied with us. China may well see action on Syria as a harbinger of things to come for their own client in Khartoum; if the logic works at Homs, why not in Dafur?

One hopes that  our policy experts advising the President have thought through the conflicting aims of all parties with an interest in Syria and realized that we lost at the Security Council because we asked the rest of the world to set aside their own interests in favor of ours. (It matters little whether we saw toppling Assad as good for Israel and Lebanon; our actions were judged by the potential outcomes, not our stated reasons). We make this mistake over and over and always seem surprised when others see us a bully; we brushed aside the Kyoto Protocol, we invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein. In part we seem to actually believe our claim that we are acting with purely altruistic motives (or imperative interests), and of course ignore all evidence to the contrary, a dangerous blindness that makes it harder to win skeptics to our side. And win we could if we would frame the discussion in terms that appeal to our opponents. Easing the Assad regime aside is critical, not just because of its crimes against its own people (and let's be real, many outsiders perceive us as just as brutal and ruthless, and perception is as important as reality in this case) but because of the massive refugee problem that would result from the violent overthrow of that regime and the instability that would follow, not just in the delicately balanced neighboring states (northern Iraq with its existing and restive Assyrian minority, Jordan with its fragile balance of Palestinians and Bedouins, Lebanon with a explosive ethnic mix - none of these would wish to see their current problems exacerbated by tens of thousands of Syrian refugees) but the same concerns resonate farther afield too as oil markets are thrown into chaos and the still damaged world economy is battered afresh. Keeping the world stable and spinning is of paramount importance to China, and some deft diplomacy would go a long way to placating their opposition; less heated rhetoric about the Chinese threat would not be amiss either.

But perhaps most importantly we need to heed Polonius' advice, not just in keeping our costume only as costly as our purse can bear, but also in being true to our own self. Our actions are rarely as altruistic as we believe, and we are never as angelic as we claim, and to pretend otherwise is only an exercise in delusion and a sign of extreme naivete or most Machevillian deception to the rest of the world watching us without rose-cored glasses; neither perception furthers our interests. From warring with the Barbary corsairs to protect our trade routes, to standing by while Saudi tanks arrived to protect  Bahrain's king from his protesting population, selfishness and self-interest have always guided our actions; we should not be surprised when others do the same.

Ring Out Wild Bells To The Wild Sky

It's traditional to use this last day of the year to collect one's thoughts, and reflect on events, ideas and important moments of the dying year before ringing out the old. While Tennyson, whose poem inspires my blog post title, may have dreamed of ringing in an era of peace, I am less sanguine  - I suspect we will see more of the thousand wars than the start of a thousand years of peace. One hopes, at the very least however, that each year finds us further ahead in our quest for improvement.

This was a year dominated by three major geo-strategic events, viz. the fall of several long-established despots in the Arab world, the general changes in the political map of the middle east and the stutter dance of the Euro zone leaders struggling to find a voice and policy in the face of stubborn economic depression and the rise of a new counter culture against the Establishment and power of the oligarchy in America. The big stories sometimes obscure other less visible, but equally important trends and the challenge for an amateur student of geo-politics is to identify those obscured threads and understand their significance in the wider picture.

By far the greatest story has been the continued turmoil in the Arab world, with the fall, and death of Col. Qaddafi in Libya, the elections in Tunisia and Egypt, both won by religious parties, the withdrawal of American combat troops from Iraq and the continued squabbling between the Iraqi leaders and the war of words between Iran and the world. But by far the most important story from this part of the world is the increasingly bloody civil-war-in-all-but-name in Syria. While the violent civil war in Libya absorbed American attention far more, mostly because of the involvement of American military forces, the events in Syria may have far greater ramifications. Libya certainly had a lot of involvement in the affairs of her neighbors, but compared to Syria, Qaddafi was a model of non-interference. Syria not only dominates the political scene in Lebanon, but also housed the leadership of Hamas and was locked in an unresolved state of war with Israel. Less spoken about but equally important is Syria's role in stability in both Iraq and Turkey, involving Kurds in both countries as well as Assyrians in northern Iraq, a role that greatly increased after the end of Saddam Hussein's government and the influx of refugees including Iraqi Baathists into Syria. And of course, Syria is an unapologetic ally and conduit for Iranian pretensions, especially vis-avis Hezbollah. While the government of Bashir Assad has seemingly lost legitimacy, at least in the eyes of the western world, it's worth recalling that the government has never had any greater legitimacy in the past, and if it survives this challenge to it's survival, the world will happily forget this phase and bestow upon it all the blessings of legitimacy again. And while the Obama Administration is reportedly working with European allies to plot an exit strategy for Assad and his coterie, the greatest fear is a collapse of Syria into chaos, a fear of the unknown that animates not just Washington and Brussels, but also Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad and Tel Aviv, and likely terrifies Beirut. No one really knows what would happen should Syria collapse: how would that affect Lebanon, how would their government and Hezbollah, a state within the state, react to Hezbollah's loss of both patron and critical supplier? how will the Palestinians react to the loss of their patron? will they stand on the sidelines, or will they choose to join in? will the loss of sanctuary push Hamas into  accommodation and compromise, or will they hew to a more hardline stance? will a flood of refugees into northern Iraq destabilize an already unstable arrangement between Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians and Sunni Arabs? will Kurds from Syria flood into Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, challenging tenuous arrangements in both countries? and most important, faced with the loss of power, will the Baathists around Assad seek to divert attention by confrontation with Israel, a tactic they may have already tried once before this year? Most importantly, we know very little about the Syrian opposition, just as we knew little about Libya's rebels, or the thousands who flooded Tahir Square to confront Egypt's Mubarak. We believe they are secular and likely friendly to us, but the longer the violence continues, the more radical groups will replace the moderate voices. The Arab Street has so far confounded all expectations, but the stakes in Syria are greater than anywhere else, and managing a soft landing in Damascus may be the greatest challenge to the world going in to this new year.

Europe's financial woes are well documented and analyzed past comprehension; it is not my intent to try and add to the discussion, especially in a subject I barely understand,  but the long drawn-out struggle has exposed and exacerbated other wounds within Europe that make a highly intriguing story as well. Most attention has focused on the economic problems, the austerity measures and the wealth disparities between north and south Europe, but there has been relatively little discussion about the social fissures in almost every European nation. It's a fairly accepted fact that extreme economic problems feed radical and often xenophobic political movements; Europe has a rich history of such movements, and plentiful targets in the numerous ethnic minorities that reside in, but have not become a part of, their societies. The past sixty years have been largely peaceful, and one may argue that it's not due to just the massive destruction and dislocation of two world wars, but the security of their welfare states that tamped down the historic urges to lash out in violence against outsiders, both within and without their borders. Now the safety net is fraying, and Europe's anger is likely to be unleashed again. So far that anger has been focused on the governments pushing austerity on the middle class, but it is only a matter of time before the anger turns towards the "outsiders" as a society wrenched from the comfortable life they'd come to regard as a birthright seek easy targets for their sense of disenchantment and grievance. The only good news is that Europe has been softened by easy living, to a point where they are less danger to the world than ever before, with a shrinking native population (and xenophobia makes it a lot harder to harness the energy of their immigrants) and atrophied armies that are mere shadows of the Grand Armee or Wehrmacht of yesteryear.

There have been many other stories this year, from the Occupy movement and the discordant yet passionate reaction to the excesses of capitalism and the power of the oligarchy represented by Wall Street, the killing of Osama bin Laden and the weakening of the original al-Qaida coupled with the rise of many more radical Islamic groups inspired by but not affiliated with bin Laden, the earlier than anticipated change of guard in North Korea with all the unknowns that entails. But for my money, the biggest under the radar story is the changes in China. Things are changing fast in the Hermit Kingdom, and how the Chinese government manages the slowing growth and increasing expectations in a world that is harder to control will shape the future of the world. I've argued before that China's facade hides many structural weaknesses and that the fundamental political flaws in an undemocratic society make it harder to navigate through difficult times. An aging population, increasing competition in low-level manufacturing as wages rise, lack of a social security net and healthcare system, unrest amongst ethnic minorities, a rising demand for higher quality of life - the list of demands facing China is extensive, and the government while seemingly aware of the dangers has not always shown that they know how to address them successfully. Recent rebellions have illuminated both the cracks in the structure and the uncertainty in the ruling circles about how to respond. Above all China is flirting with danger as they stoke nationalist fires to keep society behind the government, for those demons once released are nigh impossible to control. China's government has a critical year looming, and their success or failure in addressing the challenges before them will largely shape the chances for peace in the region and the world.