In Support of Naivete

As Egypt erupted in popular protest, on the other side of the world, Americans argued about the exact meaning of the thronging crowds in Tahir Square. Some of liberal persuasion were convinced that a popular revolution would lead to freer, more stable nation; their right-leaning mirror images were split between a fear of another Islamic revolution and Iranian-style theocracy, while a smaller fraction congratulated themselves that this was proof that their actions of the early part of the last decade were now proved right. Neither side of course was particularly eager to see the wisdom of the other, if suc wisdom did exist, and liberals celebrating the dawn of a new world, were chastised for extreme naivete.

More on the naivete anon, for I stand rather squarely in the ranks of the naïve but let me first address the self-congratulation of those neoconservatives who would claim responsibility for this potential Egyptian revolution. On the face of it, the neoconservative ideas represented a major break from conventional thinking on the right wing, and actually an embrace of some liberal themes. Certainly, no liberal can argue with the idea that a democratic and free society is an improvement on the autocracies of the Middle East. But as is always the case, the devil is in the details. I have never believed that a democratic society can be imposed upon a people, as President Bush attempted in Iraq. Democracy is about far more than elections free from fraud, important as those are. It includes a multitude of institutions and ideas that must exist and be embraced by a large majority of the population before a true democratic society can survive. Some neocons suggest that the American liberation of Western Europe from the Nazis was no different from what we did in Iraq. But Europe already had most of the critical institutions before the Nazi occupation, and in a critical difference, the Nazis were an external occupying force. In a side note, we did not create a liberal democracy when we liberated Kuwait, we restored their pre-occupation form of government. It should be remembered that we took a long time to restore Germany's democratic government, with a lengthy rebuilding of civil society; and that was again a nation that had most of the critical civic institutions in place prior to Hitler's ascension to total power.

But my objections run deeper: the Bush Administration appeared to believe that creating a liberal democracy in Iraq would lead to a domino effect whereby a tidal wave of freedom would sweep aside the theocracies and autocracies we opposed and usher in an era of peace and prosperity. I emphasize that they believed this beneficial tsunami would only hit those governments we did not like, but they had no desire, or at any rate showed no inclination to see the fruits of freedom and democracy shared by people ruled by autocracies allied to us. To me, this was always the greatest disconnect in their plans. If a free and democratic Middle East was the aim, we could have nudged our allies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia (ruled by an absolute king) or Egypt (ruled by dictators since the 1950s and under draconian emergency laws since 1981) to implement less radical but more meaningful reforms, creating the environment for real democratic change. Perhaps we urged them on in secret, but if so, our allies moved extremely slowly, and extracted massive bribes to make even the smallest changes, few of which were aimed at freedom for their people. We could have achieved change, real meaningful lasting change without ever invading Iraq; we could have let that tidal wave of freedom grow in nations that we support and bankroll, and then sweep outwards across Iraq and Syria and other autocratic nations.

Secondly, we made it clear that we would accept only those changes that fitted our view of the world. So we first urged elections in Palestine but then refused to accept the government they chose. If we truly believed in the course we'd urged on the world, we should have had the patience and fortitude to accept that sometimes the results would not suit us but that the process begun would lead to better things eventually. Now there are arguments in favor of opposing the Hamas government, mostly around their refusal to accept Israel's right to exist; I always felt however that having facilitated that government, we should have given them a chance. It wasn't as though Israel was going to be any less safe if Hamas was allowed to openly rule, with sufficient care and diligent watch. Indeed there were some conciliatory signs from Hams, albeit very small. But rather than let them grapple with the realities of ruling a government in world where one cannot just wish away the State of Israel, we refused to accept Hamas' electoral victory, blockaded the Gaza Strip and in a total repudiation of the neocon's professed theories, we attempted to overthrow Hamas' government by force through the instrument of Mohammed Dahlan.

Given the grave contradictions between word and deed, it's hardly surprising that I tend to reject the neocon idea of democratic change. But what of the idea that liberals like I are naïve to embrace this outburst of popular anger in Egypt? Perhaps we are naïve, but I for one do not expect an overnight transformation of Egypt, I simply believe that they have the same right to determine who should rule them that we have so long reserved for ourselves. Perhaps a more radical government will emerge. But will it in fact instantly march to war with Israel? Perhaps it will, in which case it will be speedily destroyed again, unless we decide to withhold aid from our greatest ally. But perhaps even a new, and let us remember populist, government may well recall that they have fought and lost three major wars; it was peace that gave them back the Sinai. These are not matters that are brought up in public, but realists in Cairo will temper any plunge to war, and their voices will likely be heard. Also, many Egyptians will recall that they have enjoyed major economic benefits from the long peace. Again, these are matters that do not play well in slogans, and may be missed even in opinion polls if the right questions are not asked, but will as many people support war when faced with personal losses. It's not just trade, either; tourists from Israel and Europe flock to Egyptian resorts, and thousands gain thereby. The world is a very different place from 1967 and the nationalist fervor that may have justified personal hardship in favor of grandiose national goals and glory has been long tempered; the people have seen the fruits of prosperity and even more, have seen how the fruits have been distributed unequally. It is my belief (and I admit, nothing more) that it will be a harder sell today for Egypt's government to march to war. And lastly, let us not ignore the forces of inertia; a peace of thirty years is less easily broken than some Americans fear.

The other major fear animating may Americans appears the idea that the next government will be radical Islamic regime, similar to that led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Again, this is always possible, but likely overblown. Certainly the Muslim Brotherhood is a major political force, but in part that may be because Hosni Mubarak has crushed all legitimate political opposition. Given a few months to find their feet, the more progressive parties will provide a powerful counter and seductive alternative to theocracy. Much of the lure of the Brotherhood lies in their transparent honesty and delivery of social services that the government fails to provide. But Egypt is not a one dimensional society, and even should the Brotherhood gain power at the hustings, their power will be constrained by a variety of other forces. Let us not forget that many cried out in horror when Turkey elected an Islamic party, yet they have remained largely unchanged. I see no reason to imagine that Egypt is any less complex and nuanced than Turkey.

Naïve I may be in believing that Egypt should choose it's own government, but in my defense let me quote Sir Winston Churchill, on Indian independence: “Power will go to the hands of rascals, rogues and freebooters. All Indian leaders will be of low calibre and men of straw. They will have sweet tongues and silly hearts. They will fight amongst themselves for power and India will be lost in political squabbles.” Churchill was often right in his predictions, but more than sixty years after the Raj ended, India continues to muddle along with no desire to return to the British crown. Sometimes those pesky freedom-seeking peoples can really confound their detractors; George III may have said the same about the rebellious American colonies.